

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2339

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MNUC, NPG, NATO
SUBJECT: NPG: APRIL 21 NPG PERMREP MEETING

REF: (A) STATE 088963/1 (DTG 202058Z APR 77) (NOTAL)
(B) USNATO 2169 (DTG 141655Z APR 77) (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: AT APRIL 21 NPG PERMREPS MEETING, THE ALLIES APPRECIATED US REP'S UPDATE ON CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, AND WELCOMED US INTENTION TO PRESENT A PAPER ON CRUISE MISSILES IN THE NAC IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ALL ALLIED REPS SPOKE DURING THE DISCUSSION, BUT MOST DECIDED NOT TO DELIVER THEIR PREPARED STATEMENTS AS A RESULT OF US ANNOUNCEMENT. THE ALLIES GENERALLY SUPPORTED IN PRINCIPLE THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL FOR A CRUISE MISSILE STUDY BY AN AD HOC GROUP UNDER THE NPG, BUT MOST CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO INITIATE SUCH A STEP NOW IN LIGHT OF THE FORTHCOMING US PAPER. FURTHERMORE, THE UK AND
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SEVERAL OTHER ALLIES ENDORSED THE PROSPECT OF INVOLVING THE FRENCH IN CRUISE MISSILE DISCUSSIONS IN THE NAC. ACTING SYG PANSU SUGGESTED THE EARLY FORMATION OF AN AD HOC STUDY GROUP WHICH WOULD ADDRESS TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF CRUISE MISSILES, PENDING RECEIPT OF THE US PAPER. HOWEVER, PERMREPS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO RECEIVE AN ESTIMATE FROM THE US WHEN ITS PAPER WOULD BE AVAILABLE BEFORE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING SUCH A SUGGESTION. US REP UNDERTOOK TO REQUEST AN ESTIMATE FROM WASHINGTON. COMMENT: THE US PAPER HAS TEMPORARILY DAMPENED ALLIED

INTEREST IN EARLY INITIATION OF A CRUISE MISSILE STUDY, ALONG LINES PROPOSED BY BELGIUM. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO PRESENT THE US PAPER SOON IN ORDER TO PREVENT POTENTIAL ALLIED INTEREST IN STEPS SUCH AS THAT SUGGESTED BY ACTING SYG PANS. TO COMPLY WITH ALLIED REQUEST, WE REQUIRE AN EARLY ESTIMATE WHEN WASHINGTON EXPECTS TO PRESENT THE US PAPER. END COMMENT. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON GUIDANCE.

END SUMMARY.

1. AT APRIL 21 NPG PERMREPS MEETING ON THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES, US REP (LEGERE) DELIVERED A STATEMENT PER GUIDANCE (REF A). IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST BY ACTING SYG PANS, AGREED TO CIRCULATE HIS REMARKS TO ALLIES AFTER THE MEETING. SUBSEQUENT PERMREP DISCUSSION CENTERED ON THE US OFFER OF A CRUISE MISSILE PAPER IN THE NAC VIS-A-VIS THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL FOR A NATO CRUISE MISSILE STUDY UNDER THE NPG (REF B).

2. PANS. NOTED THE SALT CONTEXT AS PARTICULARLY RELEVANT FOR CRUISE MISSILE DISCUSSIONS IN THE NAC. HE SAID ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN OF FRENCH SENSITIVITY. KILLICK (UK) RESPONDED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE FRENCH PARTICIPATION OR SENSITIVITY TO BE A PROBLEM, AND HE SUPPORTED THE INTRODUCTION OF THE US PAPER IN THE NAC. HE WELCOMED THE US OFFER OF A CRUISE
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MISSILE PAPER AND NOTED THE US STATEMENT CONTAINED THE FIRST MENTION OF A THEATER NUCLEAR ROLE FOR THE GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM) WITH A PROJECTED INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE OF 1980. KILLICK SAID THAT HE HAD HOPED TO MAKE A STATEMENT WHICH, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE BEEN LARGELY IN THE FORM OF QUESTIONS AND NOT CONCLUSIONS, SINCE THE UK LACKED SUFFICIENT DATA. KILLICK THEN SAID THAT THE COULD ENVISION NO FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT UNTIL THE US CIRCULATED ITS PAPER.

3. CATALANO (ITALY) NOTED THE INCREASING THREAT POSED BY WARSAW PACT TNF IMPROVEMENTS, AND SAID THAT NATO MUST CONSIDER CRUISE MISSILES IN THE CONTEXT OF "SAFEGUARDING THE EURO-STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM." THEREFORE, HIS AUTHORITIES SUPPORTED THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL, INCLUDING THE FORMATION OF AN AD HOC GROUP. CATALANO SUGGESTED THAT THE GROUP MEET IN BRUSSELS TO EMPHASIZE ITS CONTINUING CHARACTER AND THAT IT SHOULD BE REINFORCED BY EXPERTS FROM CAPITALS.

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4. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) STATED THAT, WHILE HE WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT FULLY THE GELGIAN PROPOSAL, HE NOW CONSIDERED THAT THE US OFFER OF A CRUISE MISSILE PAPER PREEMPTED AN IMMEDIATE STUDY. HE SAID THAT ANY STUDY WHICH IS EVENTUALLY INITIATED SHOULD FIRST FOCUS ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF CRUISE MISSILES. LEGERE RESPONDED PR CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE (REF A) THAT THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY OF CRUISE MISSILES REQUIRED THAT THEY BE ADDRESSED AT HIGH LEVEL AND IN A BROAD CONTEXT, SUGGESTING THAT ANY CONSIDERATION OF A STUDY BE DEFERRED UNTIL ALLIES HAD HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW AND DISCUSS THE FORTHCOMING US PAPER.

5. SVART (DENMARK) WELCOMED THE US OFFER, STATING THAT HE WOULD WITHHOLD HIS PREPARED QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS. HE SAID ONE QUESTION HE WISHED TO ASK, WHICH WAS PROMPTED BY RECENT BBC TV SPECIAL ON CRUISE MISSILES, WAS WHETHER, ONCE LAUNCHED, A CRUISE MISSILE CAN BE STOPPED SHORT OF ITS
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TARGET.

6. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) SAID THAT THE FORTHCOMING US PAPER OBVIOUSLY WOULD INFLUENCE THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL. HE FURTHER NOTED THAT IN LIGHT OF THE GREAT INTEREST OF ALLIES IN CRUISE MISSILES, HE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR ALL ALLIES TO COMMENT ON EVERY ASPECT OF THESE WEAPONS AND THAT THE US PAPER ONLY REPRESENTED ONE NATION'S VIEWS. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT THE US PAPER WOULD NOT DEPRIVE THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL OF INTEREST, ALTHOUGH FOR THE PRESENT IT "PULLED THE CARPET FROM UNDER HIS FEET".

7. KILLICK RESPONDED THAT THE US PAPER "MADE IT A NEW BALL GAME." AFTER CIRCULATION OF THE PAPER, HE ENVISIONED HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGES OF VIEWS PRIMARILY AT THE COUNCIL LEVEL. HE HOPED THAT THE PAPER WOULD BE AS DETAILED AS POSSIBLE, ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO SALT IMPLICATIONS, BUT NOT TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER ASPECTS OF IMPORTANCE TO ALLIES. SCHUURMANS SAID THAT THE AD HOC GROUP PROPOSED BY BELGIUM WOULD NOT PRECLUDE HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSION, BUT THAT HE PERSONALLY FELT INCOMPETENT TO DISCUSS VARIOUS TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THESE WEAPONS.

8. VIBE (NORWAY) SAID THAT WHILE HE STILL BELIEVED THERE WAS A NEED FOR A STUDY, AND WHILE STILL SUPPORTING THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL FOR AN AD HOC GROUP, HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT FOR THE US PAPER, AND PERHAPS ALSO FOR SECRETARY BROWN'S PRESENTATION AT OTTAWA, BEFORE PROCEEDING.

9. PAULS (FRG) SAID THAT THE US OFFER OBVIOUSLY CHANGED THE SITUATION AND THEREFORE HE WOULD NOT DELIVER HIS PREPARED REMARKS. HE SAID GERMANY WELCOMED, IN PRINCIPLE, THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL FOR A STUDY. THE FRG BELIEVED THAT CRUISE MISSILES IN THEIR NUCLEAR CONFIGURATION COULD
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STRENGTHEN AND MODERNIZE NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES AND THAT THE FRG WAS INTERESTED IN SUCH MODERNIZATION OPTIONS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY AND SHAPE DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT STUDY WOULD BE USEFUL IN CONSIDERING HOW CRUISE MISSILES COULD BE INTEGRATED INTO NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE FRG SEES CONVENTIONAL CRUISE MISSILES AS A DESIRABLE OPTION, SINCE DETERRENCE IS MAINTAINED BY A CONTINUUM OF CAPABILITIES.

10. BACON (CANADA) SAID THAT WHILE HE BELIEVED ALLIES SHOULD NOT ACT UNTIL THEY HAD STUDIED THE US PAPER, HE SAW VALUE IN BOTH THE US PROPOSAL FOR DISCUSSION IN THE NAC AS WELL AS THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL FOR A STUDY IN THE NPG.

11. ALP (TURKEY) SUPPORTED THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL, BUT THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE US HAD PROVIDED DATA VIA THE CRUISE MISSILE PAPER. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON AVAILABILITY OF THE US PAPER, LEGERE SAID THAT HIS ONLY INFORMATION WAS "NEAR FUTURE," BUT THAT HE WOULD QUERY HIS AUTHORITIES FOR MORE PRECISE INFORMATION.

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12. LAGACOS (GREECE) SAID THAT GREECE ALSO SUPPORTED
THE BELGIAN PROPOSAL BUT AWAITED THE US PAPER WITH INTEREST.

13. COLLADAY (IMS) SAID THAT HE ASSUMED THAT THE US
CRUISE MISSILE PAPER ALSO WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE
TO THE NMAS, AND HE HOPED THAT THE NMAS WOULD BE GIVEN
THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE PAPER IN ANY NAC
DISCUSSION. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE NMAS WOULD WANT TO
PARTICIPATE IN ANY AD HOC GROUP ESTABLISHED TO STUDY
CRUISE MISSILES.

14. PANSA PROPOSED A DUAL APPROACH OF INITIATING A
TECHNICAL STUDY IN NATO NOW, WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL TO
THE UNITED STATES IN COMPLETING ITS PAPER. AFTER THE
CIRCULATION OF THE PAPER, ALLIES COULD THEN RECONSIDER
WHETHER OR NOT TO CONTINUE WITH THE NATO STUDY. KILLICK
NOTED THE DIFFICULTY OF ANY NATO GROUP STUDY WITHOUT
A PRIOR US INPUT. LEGERE RESPONDED PER CONTINGENCY
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GUIDANCE (REF A) THAT THE US WAS NOT PREPARED TO
COMMIT ITSELF TO A STUDY AT THIS TIME. HARTOGH SAID
THAT PANSA'S APPROACH TOOK A VERY PESSIMISTIC VIEW
OF US TIMING FOR CIRCULATION OF ITS PAPER AND SUGGESTED
WAITING FOR THE US RESPONSE AS TO WHEN THE PAPER WOULD
BE CIRCULATED. LEGACOS AGREED AND SAID HE HOPED THAT
THE US COULD PROVIDE AN ANSWER WITHIN A FEW DAYS.
THIS VIEW RECEIVED GENERAL ALLIED SUPPORT.

15. ACTION REQUESTED: EARLY WASHINGTON GUIDANCE REGARDING
THE ESTIMATED DATE OF CIRCULATION OF THE CRUISE MISSILE
PAPER TO ALLIES.

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